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Abstract
How much carbon is in the price of power? The answer to this question
determines many economic consequences of climate policies, i.e. in terms of
costs for downstream industries. It requires, however, to first identify the cost
impact of carbon pricing on the price-setting entity on the power market.
Economic theory tells us that power prices are determined by the cost of the
marginal plant. We propose two simple approaches to conclude on marginal
technologies in electricity wholesale from public data. Both approaches are
complementary, easy to implement, and based upon assumptions which are
commonly used in more complex energy system models. We exemplify their use
with a policy example on the compensation for indirect emission costs from the
EU Emissions Trading Scheme. We find that the current policy design severely
overweighs CO2 emissions from lignite power plants in the Central Western
Europe power market, which may lead to overcompensation of industrial
power users and therefore to a distortion with regard to the policy’s stated goal.
JEL codes: Q41, Q48, Q58
Keywords: Marginal technology, price formation, power market, EU ETS,
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1 Introduction
How much carbon is in the price of power? The Paris Agreement requires drastic
changes around the world to decarbonise the economy, and, above all, the power
sector. In the European Union, carbon dioxide emissions are subject to the EU
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which is possibly the most prominent example
for an international market based climate policy on the planet. The economic impact
of such energy and climate policies depends on how they affect the various market
equilibria along the supply chain. For electric power markets, this equilibrium is
characterised by the “marginal plant”. At a specific point in time, a plant is said to
be marginal, if all cheaper technologies are already fully employed and the plant is
the least-cost available option to satisfy the remaining demand. The price to get this
plant running clears the market. Thus, marginal plants are said to be price-setting.
An assessment of energy policies that affect electricity prices therefore crucially relies
on identifying marginal plants and their technological characteristics. Specifically, the
impact of emissions trading on electricity prices depends on the actual pass-through
of emission cost by the marginal plants. Without identifying those plants, the price
impact of emissions trading on power markets cannot be credibly assessed.
Price-affecting climate policies bear the potential to worsen the competitiveness of
industries that compete on global markets. Compensation schemes are thus designed
to ease the competitive burden of these policies. The parametrisation of those
schemes and consequently, the overall compensation level, needs to be based on some
measure of the policy’s market impact, which in turn, is determined by the marginal
plant.
This article illustrates two simple approaches to infer marginal technologies from
observed market data in a transparent manner and with high timely resolution. We
use the concept that lies beneath much more complex fundamental energy system
models, and show how this can be applied for a simple but not necessarily less
plausible method to determine marginal technologies from observed data. We take a
view from two different angles: (1) realised load and its relation to available capacity,
(2) realised prices and how they compare to approximated marginal costs. Both
approaches are complementary rather than mutually exclusive and can be particularly
helpful whenever the parameters for specific policies depend on identifying marginal
power plants.
The motivating example for this study is the compensation mechanism for indirect
CO2 costs induced by the emissions trading scheme in the European Union. Indirect
CO2 costs arise from the cost for emission allowances used in power production,
driving up the market price for electricity. EU Member States are allowed to
implement a compensation scheme to reduce the burden for electricity consuming
industries, but the European Commission has issued binding guidelines on a maximum
level of the firm’s compensation amount (EU Commission 2012). This level depends
inter alia on emission factors of power production, which are defined in the guidelines
and fixed on a region-specific level. Since the actual indirect CO2 costs depend on the
emission intensities of the marginal plants, choosing an appropriate level is crucial
for the scheme to compensate as intended by the regulator. We consider this to be
a typical parametrisation problem of the regulator, which for energy and climate
policies very often depends on the identification of marginal technologies.
According to the European Commission, the currently defined emission factors are
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based on the weighted average CO2 intensities of electricity generation from fossil
fuels in certain regions. However, when wholesale electricity prices are set by the
marginal plant, the average emission intensity of fossil fuel fired power production
does not reflect the actual CO2 cost that is passed-on to the market clearing price.
Instead, the impact of CO2 costs on electricity prices will depend on the emission
intensities of the marginal plants (Fabra and Reguant 2014; Hintermann 2016). For
different hours and load levels, different technologies with varying emission intensities
will be marginal. And the proportion in which these technologies will be marginal
is most likely not the same as the technology’s share in total generation of fossil
fuel based technologies. Consequently, the current compensation scheme, based on
emission factors ignoring these aspects, may over- or under-compensate relative to
the intended level of compensation for indirect CO2 costs.
Intended and actual compensation levels will differ most remarkably in systems in
which emission intensive technologies have a large share in generation - driving up
the average emission factor - but are only marginal in a few hours of the year. A
prime candidate of such a technology are lignite power plants. Lignite is a high
emission intensive fuel compared to natural gas or even hard coal. At the same
time, lignite plants in Western Europe typically have lower specific fuel costs than
natural gas or hard coal plants, which allows lignite plants to hold a high market
share. Thus, there is reason to doubt that lignite is indeed price-setting in a relevant
number of hours. If this is not the case, including CO2 emissions from lignite in the
calculation of emission factors for CO2 cost compensation may overstate its actual
impacts on the power price and consequently, the level of compensation for indirect
CO2 costs.
Central Western Europe (CWE), covering France, Germany, Austria and the Benelux
countries, is one region defined by the EU Commission with a common emission
factor in the compensation scheme. The bulk of fossil fuel power plants in this region
are located in Germany and among all CWE countries, only Germany possesses
active lignite power stations. Still, CO2 emissions from lignite account for about 42
percent of all CO2 emissions in electricity generation in the CWE region.1 Thus, the
impact of CO2 emissions from lignite in Germany on the average emission factor
in the CWE region is non-negligible. But in Germany, lignite plants are usually
considered to be base load capacities, which - by definition - are hardly price-setting.
Consequently, we focus our analysis on the German and Austrian electricity wholesale
market and the period from July 2015 to July 2017. The reason for choosing this
period being that one of our approaches requires technology specific production data,
which is not available before July 2015. We choose a sample of two complete years
to ensure that no imbalance in the covered seasons could introduce any bias.
Overall, we find that the share of hours, in which lignite was likely price-setting in the
German and Austrian wholesale market for electricity, was about 3 to 7 percent and
clearly below 15 percent for the period covered in our sample. This finding is in stark
contrast to the weight of 39 percent that CO2 emissions of lignite currently have in
the average emission factor. Therefore, including total CO2 emissions from lignite in
the calculation for the current emission factors for indirect CO2 cost compensation
clearly overstates its actual impacts on the indirect CO2 costs in Central Western
Europe.
1Period from 2005 to 2015, own calculation based on data from Eurostat and IPCC default
emission factors for fossil fuels. Note that lignite in Germany typically exhibits a higher emission
intensity than the IPCC factors, see Juhrich (2016).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 puts our approaches
in relation to the literature and details out the scope of our contribution. Section
3 explains the concept of marginality, outlines the empirical approaches to identify
marginal plants, and discusses their challenges. Section 4 and 5 present the method-
ology and data for either approach and the findings with respect to lignite as a
marginal technology. Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of
our analysis.
2 Relation to the literature and scope of the con-
tribution
The most common approach to analyse the power system and its technological and
economic interdependencies are fundamental energy system models. The existing
literature on energy modelling is very broad and an extensive review is beyond the
scope of this article (see e.g. Hirth (2018) or Beran, Pape, and Weber (2019) for an
overview on different modelling approaches). However, some widely shared features
of fundamental energy system models can be summarised as follows: They are mainly
numerically solvable optimisation models which use technological information and
market data to represent the system-wide provision of energy which meets market
demand and obeys the technological and economic constraints. For the provision of
electric power, these constraints include fuel costs, capacity, and availability of power
generation. A well-calibrated power market model therefore allows to determine
marginal plants by back-casting actual market outcomes. Beran, Pape, and Weber
(2019), Kallabis, Pape, and Weber (2016), Hirth (2018), Bublitz, Keles, and Fichtner
(2017), Everts, Huber, and Blume-Werry (2016), Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2008)
as well as Müsgens (2006) can serve as examples for such an approach, comparing
realised prices in the past with model results for marginal cost. Recently, Blume-
Werry et al. (2018) investigate price-setting technologies on European markets
ex-ante for the year 2020 against the background of a proposed minimum carbon
price in the Netherlands.
A strength of fundamental energy system models is their capability to produce
forecasts and scenario analyses, see e.g. Weron (2014) for an overview. A point of
critique frequently brought forward, however, highlights that the models’ complexity
make them akin to a ‘black box’ to the uninitiated. Thus, a common worry is that
the models’ results are mainly driven by their underlying assumptions and that their
validity is hard to assess. Nahmmacher et al. (2016), for example, investigate the
sensitivity of model outcomes with respect to the choice of representative days and
propose an approach for their selection as input data in energy system models. On
the transparency side, there is an important stream of research working on opening
‘the black box’ by publishing the energy system models’ code and data sources for
public scrutiny and collaborative work. Pfenninger et al. (2018) and Pfenninger et
al. (2017) provide an authoritative account of these efforts. Open energy system
modelling is a great leap forward for transparency in policy consulting and policy
design. However, the usage and scrutiny of these models will always be restricted to
a group of experts with corresponding training.
The aim of our work is therefore not to rival with fully fledged energy system models,
but to provide an easily accessible alternative for the ex-post determination of
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marginal technologies. Our method is meant to be transparent and easy to use to
inform policy makers in their assessment of CO2 cost pass-through and price impacts.
It could even serve for a dynamic and purely data driven updating of policy parameters
based on some general assumptions made by the regulator. Our approaches are
based on simple computations, which we implemented in the open source statistical
software R. It is straightforward, however, to perform similar computations with a
broad range of widely used software – in particular, spreadsheet programs – which
should make our approach particular appealing to a larger, non-expert audience.
Our identification of marginal plants evidently requires a number of assumption, but
not substantially more (or more critical ones) than those required for most energy
system models. Moreover, our two approaches rely on differing assumptions. Thus,
comparing results across methods will help to check their plausibility. Finally, the
approaches do not require any explicit optimisation algorithm. Indeed, all we do is
to summarise and interpret a number of descriptive statistics against the backdrop
of a set of transparently stated assumptions about the market mechanism. Thus, our
approach should be easily reproduced without a specific modelling software. Another
contribution of this paper is to exemplify how such a simple calculation can be used
to check the parametrisation of a policy for consistency with the declared aim of
being a compensation for incurred CO2 costs. In this paper, we apply our method
for illustrative purpose to a specific technology – lignite based power generation -
in a specific market - the German and Austrian wholesale electricity market - but
comparable approaches are straightforward to implement for similar questions in
different circumstances.
Besides our contribution on methodology, we also contribute to the existing literature
by analysing a particular new policy, namely compensation for indirect emission
costs. For example, Kallabis, Pape, and Weber (2016), Bublitz, Keles, and Fichtner
(2017), Everts, Huber, and Blume-Werry (2016), Hirth (2018) as well as Beran, Pape,
and Weber (2019) examine different drivers of the evolution of electricity prices in
Germany and Europe. Furthermore, Müsgens (2006) and Weigt and von Hirschhausen
(2008) investigate issues of market power in electricity markets. However, to the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to study marginality and its implications
for the emission factors set in the EU Guidelines for the compensation of indirect
emission cost. This is in stark contrast to the currently high interest of policy makers
in the issue. Current Guidelines will expire on 31 December 2020. They therefore
have to be revised for the next trading period starting on 1 January 2021. The
current redesign of the compensation mechanism by the European Commission is
correspondingly high on the agenda of national regulators and industry associations
alike, as witnessed by the public and targeted consultations2.
2See https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/ets_en.html
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3 Concept of marginality and empirical ap-
proaches
3.1 Motivation to study marginality of lignite power plants
Emissions from lignite fired power plants have a high weight in the emission factor
that is used to compensate industries for indirect CO2 costs. However, for the
German market, lignite plants are generally considered to serve base load, running
most of the time due to their low marginal costs. This means that the electricity
price level is no crucial determinant of the decision to produce power from lignite
once the investment costs are sunk. In return, one can assume that the marginal
costs of lignite plants, including marginal emission costs, are no crucial driver of
the electricity price level. Such reasoning would obviously fail (a.) due to enormous
increases in their marginal costs, e.g. when greenhouse gas emissions are priced
heavily, or (b.) when lignite plants are priced out of the market due to cheaper rival
technologies. The former scenario (a.) does not prevail in any jurisdiction around the
world yet but has gained in relevance with the price increase for European Emission
Allowances in 2018. The latter scenario (b.), however, could be relevant in energy
systems with large renewable or nuclear capacities in the market or in connected
neighbouring markets. Both of the latter conditions apply for Germany. Thus, we
study marginality of lignite specifically for the German-Austrian market.
3.2 The concept of marginality and the merit-order
‘Merit-order-pricing’ is a stylised model of price formation in electricity markets:
when power plants are ordered according to their marginal costs, the last plant that
is necessary to satisfy demand sets the price. But what price does the plant set?
One possible assumption would be that all plants are pricing at their own marginal
costs. An economically more plausible assumption is that the plant owner is pricing
just a tiny amount below the marginal cost of the closest competitor to keep the next
plant out of the market but still raising the own margin. Without more detailed
plant level information, but knowing that no generation technology is completely
monopolised within the German-Austrian market, we can assume that all plants of
the same technology compete with each other, and thus, it is the marginal cost of the
marginal technology which is setting the price. Indeed, most of the well-established
energy system models used in industry and for policy consulting are based on some
variant of such a merit order model (see e.g. Hirth 2018; Weigt and von Hirschhausen
2008; Müsgens 2006). Figure 1 illustrates the concept.
3.3 Approaches to evaluate if a technology is price setting
Building on a simplified merit-order model and without detailed plant level data, we
consider two different approaches. Both approaches are based on the fundamental
principle that the intersection of supply and demand determines prices and quantities
in wholesale electricity markets (Stoft 2002). Observing equilibrium prices and
quantities, the marginality of lignite power plants is inferred from two different
angles (basically along each axis in Figure 1). While the first approach focusses on
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Figure 1: The merit-order (stylised) as a concept for price formation in electricity
markets
quantities, specifically available capacities and demand (the abscissa in Figure 1),
the second one exploits that observed prices (plotted on the ordinate in Figure 1)
result from the intersection of supply and demand and therefore, can refer to the
marginal technology:
1.) Quantity approach: Marginality according to residual load. We identify
hours in which total electricity demand is such that it fulfils the following two criteria:
a.) Load is so high that it cannot be covered alone by production from technologies
that rank before lignite in the merit-order; b.) load is so low that no technology which
is more expensive than lignite is needed to satisfy total demand. In this approach,
we identify residual load for lignite after production from cheaper technologies is
subtracted and evaluate whether it falls within the range of available capacity for
lignite rather than exceeding it. Due to the varying nature of electricity demand, this
approach is most reasonably executed at the highest available frequency, i.e. hourly.
2.) Price-cost approach: Marginality according to marginal costs. We
identify time periods, in which electricity prices are above the marginal costs of the
most efficient lignite power plants, such that lignite plants are in the market, but
below the marginal costs of the closest more expensive competitor, which, in our
case, is the most efficient hard coal fired power plant. Both technologies are subject
to start-up and ramping costs which render them inflexible to a certain degree with
respect to high frequency price changes. This is captured in our approach comparing
marginal costs to daily average prices, assuming that plants are sufficiently flexible
to react to price drops that extend over at least 24 hours. Moreover, note that the
day-ahead auction takes place at noon the day before delivery. A plant that would
have to shut down or to start-up for the period of 24 hours would still have 12 hours
to adjust before the beginning of the delivery period. Taking daily average prices
may thus help to overcome the potential bias introduced by those inflexibilities.
Taking the two approaches in parallel and comparing the results helps us to control
for the drawbacks of either one.
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3.4 Challenges of identification of the marginal technology
3.4.1 Deviations from the strict merit-order model
The following paragraphs address potential issues concerning the concept of marginal-
ity and pricing behaviour of power plants, specifically deviations from the merit-order
due to inflexibilities and forward contracting. These aspects can be dealt with on
one hand, by using additional market specific information. On the other hand, we
believe that taking two different perspectives - one on prices, one on quantities - with
possibly different frequencies of observation allows to account for deviations in plant
scheduling.
The merit-order model is economically and technologically intuitive, but a bit too
simplistic to fully capture the reality of production and pricing decisions in power
markets. Plants might stay on the grid during hours where the price appears to
be below their (short run) marginal costs, or plants that could possibly produce
profitably for certain hours might stay out of the market for some unobserved reasons.
The former plants are often referred to as “must-run capacities” while the exact
reason for why they “must-run” is not evident. Possibilities are e.g. combined heat-
power (CHP) plants that base their production decisions on two separate streams of
revenues. An optimised CHP-production schedule can then look like a “must-run”
production with regard to the power output. Start-up and ramping costs are another
possibility which could convince a plant owner to stay online for certain hours at a
loss to be able to produce during other subsequent hours with a profit. Evidently,
such frictions blur the picture that one can obtain based on simple merit-order
reasoning. We discuss some of these issues in the next subsection.
Aside of these hard to quantify technological and economic aspects, the merit-order
model relies on the assumption that firms base their decisions on marginal costs alone,
disregarding possibilities to exert market power and total cost recovery. Nevertheless,
merit-order pricing still is the dominating assumption underlying most energy system
models and in the competitive market setting that we currently observe in the CWE
region, marginal cost based pricing appears to be a reasonable assumption.
3.4.2 Start-up costs, block bids and economic must-run
Many power plants are characterised by inflexibilities. In economic terms, these
inflexibilities take the form of start-up and ramping costs. The high costs to heat
especially large thermal power plants, such as lignite or nuclear plants, render a fast
adjustment of production to short lived price changes unattractive. To account for
these inflexibilities, power can be traded forward in blocks of several hours, days or
weeks. One could suppose therefore, that a producer who is completely hedged might
not react to short time price changes. This latter form of inflexibility is sometimes
referred to as ‘economic must-run’. However, any participant on the wholesale market
has the possibility to continuously trade and adjust positions, i.e. buying back power
for single hours that had been sold as part of a block before. Forward contracted
power producers therefore continuously face “make-or-buy” decisions which induce
the incentive to adjust production to short-term price fluctuations. Based on this
reasoning, “economic must-run” therefore does not appear to be relevant beyond the
physical constraints induced by the different production technologies. “Economic”
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must-run might, however, occur for smaller producers which cannot afford to maintain
a trading unit for short-term adjustments that actually realise the opportunity profits
from short-term markets.
An exact separation of ‘economic’ or ‘technological’ must-run is not possible. In
the end, every production decision is based on an economic decision subject to
technologically determined constraints and costs. The German Transmission System
Operators (TSOs) commissioned a study on the dimension of the capacity which can
be expected to “must run” (Consentec 2016). The results give a first impression on
the scale of the phenomenon. Further details on this study are given in Section 4.2.5.
4 Analysis of marginality according to residual
load
4.1 Approach based on residual load calculation
In our first approach, we evaluate the relevance of lignite as a price setting technology
through the lens of market data on load, generation, and available capacity. The
approach builds on market quantities rather than prices. Identification is based on
the merit-order model: Assuming a set of technologies with typically lower marginal
cost than lignite (e.g. hydro, nuclear, also called ‘inframarginal technologies’ in the
following), we conclude that lignite is not price setting whenever the observed output
from these technologies alone suffices to serve overall demand. Lignite would then be
‘out-of-the-market’. On the contrary, when total demand exceeds the production from
cheaper technologies, we know that the residual load for lignite power plants is just
the difference of total demand and the production from these cheaper technologies.
We can then compare this residual demand to the available capacity of lignite.
If lignite capacities do not suffice to meet residual demand, we know that more
expensive technologies must kick-in and lignite will thus again not be price setting.
Classifying all observed time periods according to these possibilities allows us to
deduce the periods in which lignite is neither out-of-the-market, nor insufficient to
meet its residual demand. For these periods, lignite power plants qualify to be at
the margin, and thus price-setting.
4.2 Data sources on production, consumption, and capaci-
ties
4.2.1 Data on generation
We obtain hourly, day-ahead planned generation for the German-Austrian bidding
zone from the EEX transparency platform for all available technologies, comprising
the following: biomass, coal, gas, pumped-storage, run-of-the-river, seasonal-store,
coal-derived-gas, garbage, lignite, oil, other, uranium, wind-offshore, wind-onshore.
Technology specific data for generation is available from 29 July 2015 onwards. The
last day in our sample is 28 July 2017, giving us exactly two years for the analysis.
So all seasons enter with equal frequency.
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The implausibly low reported quantities on generation from wind and biomass in
this data set, and the missing information on solar require the use of additional
data from other sources. For wind and solar power, we refer to the hourly data on
day-ahead predicted inflows from the EEX transparency platform.
As there is no corresponding data on power production from biomass, we follow
Agora Energiewende in their approach to impute biomass production3, which is
assumed to enter uniformly and at a stable rate. The production levels are imputed
such that they conform to the yearly reported overall production as well as to the
intra-yearly increases in installed capacity.
4.2.2 Data on cross-border flows
We obtain scheduled cross-border flows for all interconnectors to/from the German-
Austrian bidding zone in hourly frequency from the ENTSO-E transparency platform.
We aggregate flows into net-flows such that negative flows indicate net imports.
Several interconnectors, especially smaller ones, lack data for significant time windows.
Corresponding flows are counted as zero when calculating total net exports from
the German-Austrian bidding zone to neighbouring countries. The corresponding
interconnectors are minor in terms of capacity and excluding all observations due to
missing data on some interconnectors would mean to throw away a lot of available
information from the other interconnectors and the data sources.
Following this definition, we observe net cross-border flows from 29 July 2015 to 28
July 2017.
4.2.3 Data on demand
We obtain data on the total system load for the German-Austrian bidding zone from
the ENTSO-E transparency platform at hourly frequency. It is known from Hirth
and Schumacher (2015) that these load levels do not represent actual total electricity
consumption in precise quality due to several reporting problems, especially with
respect to self-consumption. However, these data are the only available in sufficiently
high frequency. Moreover, the ENTSO-E data is consistent with the other data we
use. We therefore rely on the ENTSO-E data, which also represents the industry
standard.
A total of 96 hours in our sample has missing values for predicted load. We replace
the corresponding missing entries with the realised load levels whenever the latter
are available.
4.2.4 Data on available capacity
We obtain information on available capacity from the EEX transparency platform
and screen all documented capacity reports for the last available date before actual
production. Thus, we typically capture the day-ahead reported availabilities.
Due to shortcomings of the EEX transparency platform when updating their server
in 2016, available capacity reports from the first semester of 2016 are completely
3See http://www.agora-energiewende.de/agorameter.
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missing. Discarding the whole semester for the analysis would significantly reduce
our sample. As a means of interpolation, we alternatively use the median reported
available capacity within the time frame from 29 July 2015 and 28 July 2017 which
amounts to 17.686 GW. In other words, half of the daily reported values are above
this number, while the other half is below. Note that the distribution of records of
available capacity for lignite is left-skewed such that our median capacity is much
closer to the maximum observed available capacity of 20.044 GW rather than to the
minimum observed capacity (see Figure 2 below). Details and validity checks are
reported later in conjunction with the empirical analysis.
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Figure 2: Available Capacity Reporting for Lignite
day−ahead reported available capacity
de
ns
ity
median value
maximum observation
estimated density
period from 29 July 2015 to 28 July 2017
4.2.5 Data on ‘must-run’ capacities
As explained before, the definition of must-run capacities is vague, and a clear
cut quantification is missing. The crucial characteristic of must-run capacities for
this analysis is that they are by definition not responding to electricity price level.
Technologies that are more expensive could thus alter the residual load for lignite.
Moreover, some parts of the lignite plants might also be ‘must-run’ capacities and
therefore would not bid according to marginal costs. We use the results of Consentec
(2016) as a measure of must-run capacities which are considered to be generating
independently of the price level. Averaging over the three different scenarios in
Consentec (2016) yields the following quantities for must-run capacities:
Table 1: Must-Run Capacities based on Consentec, 2016
Fuel Type Capacity in MW
lignite 8526.3
uranium 6981.7
coal 2587.3
gas 1901.3
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Fuel Type Capacity in MW
oil 62.0
garbage 148.3
run-of-the-river 118.3
pumped-storage 70.3
seasonal store 18.3
other 869.0
4.3 Results on marginality according to residual load
4.3.1 Marginality based on simple residual load
Taking all information together, we obtain the following data set with the corre-
sponding variables for our residual load calculation.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for data on quantities
Variable Min Median Max Observations Missing
predicted load 38131 62359 85600 17540 4
planned generation nuclear 2852 8174 9926 17542 2
planned generation garbage 8 136 222 17542 2
planned generation run-of-the-river 221 1690 4302 17542 2
predicted wind and solar 5891 17969 58090 17533 11
net exports -7065 4675 13744 17542 2
available lignite capacity 12852 17686 20044 13369 4175
inframarg 13284 27968 69423 17533 11
In total, we have 17,532 complete hourly observations, except for the available
capacity of lignite. Residual load for lignite power plants is calculated as system load
minus the generation from technologies that are considered to run at lower marginal
costs (thus being inframarginal compared to lignite). We consider the following
technologies to fulfil this condition: uranium, run-of-the-river, garbage, wind, solar,
biomass.
To illustrate our approach consider Figure 3. It shows (from top to bottom) day-ahead
predicted load plus net export (black line), planned production from technologies
that are considered to be inframarginal (shaded area in light blue), and the reported
available capacity of lignite (dark brown shaded area) over the course of our sample
period. Residual demand for lignite is therefore given by the lower border of the
light blue shaded area. The occurrences where residual demand dips into the range
of available capacity of lignite are those which can be considered to be hours where
lignite would be marginal (not yet accounting for must-run technologies). The first
half of 2016 shows the large gap in the time series of available capacities. For not
completely discarding this period, one has to assume some form of interpolation for
the available capacity of lignite. In our case, we chose the median value of those
values that we do observe, depicted by the dashed, red line below.
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Figure 3: Residual load and available capacity
M
W
load + net exports
reported capacity lignite
inframarginal production
median capacity lignite
Evaluating our sample for the marginality of lignite, using the median available
capacity of lignite for interpolation, we obtain 541 hours out of 17,532 fulfilling the
marginality condition. This corresponds to 3.1 percent of all hours in our sample.
4.3.2 Sensitivity with respect to interpolation
The graphical presentation in Figure 3 indicates that the actual reported available
capacities do not vary much around the median and drop more prominently below,
rather than above. This suggests that the median could serve as a good proxy for
the missing data. To get a better understanding of how well the median proxies
actual available capacities in relation to residual load, we compare both methods
on the same reduced sample. Precisely, we calculate the ratio of marginal hours for
lignite solely based on the sample where we have actual reports and compare this
ratio with the ratio that one obtains, using only the median capacity on the same
sample. We find 2.8 percent of hours in which lignite is likely marginal using the
actual reports, compared to 3.2 when using the median of the available capacity as
a proxy. This suggests that our approach using the median rather overestimates
the number of hours where lignite is marginal compared to the actual reports. This
is not surprising in light of the skewed distribution of available capacity, showing
that the median is closer to the maximum rather than the minimum. Overall, both
numbers are still very close which makes us confident that the interpolation we used
before is a good approximation.
4.3.3 Accounting for must-run capacities
The previous numbers do not take into account that several capacities might must
run. This applies both to e.g. hard coal or gas fired plants which would then be
placed in the merit-order before lignite plants, but it would also apply to parts of the
lignite plants. Plants that must run are by definition not reacting to price signals
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and are therefore not price setting in the sense of marginal-cost-based pricing. As
discussed above, information on capacities that ‘must run’ and to what degree this
‘must’ applies is sparse. As an approximation, we are using the information from
Consentec (2016) to account for must-run capacities by technology. In the following,
we add must-run capacities for technologies which had not yet been declared to be
inframarginal (e.g. hard coal, gas, oil. . . ) to the block of inframarginal production.
On the other hand, we consider only those available capacities of lignite power plants
to be potentially price setting which exceed the capacities that are declared to ‘must
run’.
Figure 4 below depicts again predicted load plus net exports in black. But now,
we subtract the must-run capacities of more expensive technologies (coal, gas, etc.
in pink). Again, we moreover subtract the production from cheaper, inframarginal
technologies (nuclear, renewables in light blue) to obtain residual demand for lignite
(lower border of the light blue shaded area). Reported available capacities of lignite
are depicted in dark brown as before. We moreover account for the must-run
capacities of lignite which cannot be price setting. They are marked below in light
grey.
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Figure 4: Residual load, available capacity, and must−run capacities
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For this modified setting, we find 1,344 hours fulfilling the marginality criterion based
on the interpolation of missing availability data with the median. This corresponds
to 7.7 percent of hours in our sample. When using only those hours for which
we have full capacity reports, we find 7 percent of hours fulfilling the marginality
criterion, while when we use the median as a proxy for available capacity over the
full sample, we find 8.3 percent. Again this points to our interpolation using the
median is overstating rather than understating the importance of lignite as a price
setting technology.
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4.3.4 Robustness check: maximum available capacity
This analysis takes different approaches to determine residual demand for lignite
plants and compares it to reported available capacities where possible. It moreover
uses an interpolation for periods where availably capacity reports are missing, and
checks the sensitivity of this approximation. The chosen method (taking the median)
is found to exaggerate rather than underestimate the relevance of lignite as a marginal
technology. As another robustness check for this interpolation, we repeat the analysis
using the clearly exaggerating assumption that available capacity in the time where
reports are missing had been at the maximum value we observe in our sample. Under
this maximum assumption, we find 3.7 percent of our sample to fulfil the marginality
condition, not taking potential must-run capacities into account, and 9 percent when
accounting for must-run capacities as detailed above. Note that these values are
still clearly below 10 percent, even though these values are exaggerated due to the
maximum assumption on available capacity.
5 Analysis of marginality according to marginal
costs
5.1 The approach based on marginal cost calculation
In the first approach, we have drawn conclusions on the relevance of lignite as a
price setting technology from demand, production, and available capacity. Such a
quantity-based analysis evidently depends on a number of assumptions concerning
the merit-order and the price responsiveness of power plants. The second approach
takes a different perspective on the same question, drawing conclusions from realised
prices and production costs. Lignite power plants are considered to be price setting
when market conditions are such that lignite plants can recover their marginal costs
(meaning they are “in the money”) but more expensive competitors cannot (putting
the latter “out of the money”). We are thus interested in the price range that spans
between the marginal costs of lignite power plants and the closest marginal competitor,
usually hard coal fired plants. We then identify how often the observed prices fall
within this price range, suggesting that lignite plants have been price-setting during
the corresponding periods.
This approach does not depend on observed quantities or assumptions about must-
run capacities. Recall, that start-up or ramping costs can render adjustments to
short term price changes too expensive for large scale power plants. The day-ahead
market for electric power at EPEXSpot accounts for such kind of frictions by allowing
“block-bids”. The standard traded unit in the day-ahead market is the delivery of
electric power during a specific hour of the following day. Block-bids allow tying
together several hour-contracts to larger blocks of hours. Common blocks are “base
load” or “peak load blocks” which capture all 24 hours, or all hours from 8 a.m. to
8 p.m. respectively. A selling bid for example is executed when the average price
for all covered hours is above the price limit of the seller. The seller has then sold
power for all hours of the block, although the price for power in some of these hours
might be below the variable production cost of the producing plant. For an outsider,
observing a plant producing at prices below its marginal costs therefore apparently
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“must-run”, although it might go offline when such low prices prevail for a longer
period.
It is simple to account for such block-bidding in our price-based approach. In the
following, we consider day-ahead prices for the full block of 24 hours. These blocks
are traded one day ahead at noon, leaving 12 hours before delivery begins. Thus,
a conventional coal or lignite plant with limited flexibility can sell such a block
and still has half a day to ramp up, and no need to adjust production during the
day. The plant thus could be marginal for the whole day on average, although in
the shorter run, we see price variations between different hours. Thus, we consider
this approach to be more robust with respect to ramping and the specification of
must-run technologies. On the other hand, we have to rely on estimates for the
marginal costs of lignite and hard coal plants, based on the data we describe in the
following.
5.2 Data on prices and cost
5.2.1 Data on prices for electricity and emission allowances
We obtain hourly day ahead auction prices for the German-Austrian bidding zone
from EEX for the time period from 29 July 2015 to 28 July 2017. The hourly prices
are averaged on a daily basis which is equivalent to the Physical Electricity Index
Phelix. EU emission allowances prices are obtained from the EUA spot market at
EEX.
5.2.2 Data on the cost of power production from lignite
Lignite is hardly traded and usually produced close to the actual plant it fires. The
most recent study on the production cost of lignite is from Öko-Institut (2017). They
distinguish production costs of older and newer plants. As a lower bound for our
relevant price range, we are interested in the lowest marginal costs of lignite, which
are with the newer and more efficient plants. For newer lignite plants, Öko-Institut
(2017) estimates marginal fuel costs of 3.6 Euro per Megawatt hour (MWh) electric
output and additional variable costs of 2 Euro per MWh electric output. The study
moreover reports specific CO2 emissions of 963 kilogram (kg) per MWh electric
output. Together with the EUA prices, we can approximate daily marginal costs for
the production of electric power from lignite by summing up fuel cost and emission
cost per MWh electric output.
5.2.3 Data on the cost of power production from hard coal
For the price of hard coal, we refer to the weekly McCloskey MCIS Marker coal
price index for North-West Europe. It is normalised to the price of hard coal with
a calorific value of 6000 kilocalories (kcal) per kg for delivery in the Amsterdam-
Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) region harbours. We translate the price into Euro values,
using the European Central Banks (ECB) official USD/EUR daily exchange rate.
We moreover adjust the price per ton to represent the inner German 2015 average
heat rate for hard coal of 6448 kcal/kg (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen 2017).
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To account for shipping costs from ARA to Germany, we add costs of 1.53 Euro
per ton as suggested by BAFA (2016). Finally, we attribute the weekly published
price index to each following day after its publication until a new price observation
is available.
As we are interested in the closest competitor to lignite, we look for the lowest
marginal costs of a hard coal plant. We observe efficiency rates of 0.465 for the most
efficient German hard coal plant based on the data gathered by Open-Power-System-
Data.org. With respect to the CO2 content of the fuel, we refer to Juhrich (2016),
reporting 93.6 ton CO2 per Terajoule (TJ) thermal input for hard coal. From these
numbers, we can calculate fuel cost per MWh electric output for the most efficient
hard coal plant. Together with the CO2 price data, we can moreover calculate the
emissions cost per MWh electric output. Finally, we are lacking precise estimates
on further marginal cost components such as wear-and-tear. As a proxy, we use the
same amount of 2 Euro per MWh electric output as for the lignite plants.
5.3 Results on marginality according to marginal costs
5.3.1 Marginality according to marginal costs
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of marginal costs for hard coal and lignite plants that
we calculate based on the efficiency levels, CO2 contents, input prices, and further
variable costs as detailed above.
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The range between the marginal costs of these two types of fuels (here shaded in
light brown) can be expected to be the price range in which lignite power plants are
price setting. The following graph (Figure 6) puts on a larger scale the daily average
power prices (physical electricity index, “Phelix”) in comparison to the marginal
costs.
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It is evident that over the course of this period, power prices are typically above the
the marginal costs hard coal fired power plants and just occasionally fall into the
cost range that spans between lignite and hard coal. This suggests that usually more
expensive technologies than lignite are price setting in the day ahead market.
However, in late 2016, we also observe power prices dipping below the marginal costs
of lignite, thus implying that coal and lignite plants would have been out of the
market altogether. Precisely, we find that power prices are in between the marginal
costs of lignite and hard coal for 90 days of our sample which covers 731 days in total.
In relative terms, the days where lignite would be potentially marginal correspond
to 12.3 percent of the total number of days within our observed time period.
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Figure 6: Power prices and marginal cost range between lignite and hard coal
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5.3.2 Robustness checks: fuel switch
Throughout this study, we have largely considered the merit-order to be stable
across generation technologies. In other words: while we did allow costs to fluctuate
for different fuels, we did not consider the case where marginal costs of different
technologies switch their order.
For the case of hard coal and lignite, we can see from the Figure 5 and 6 that such a
switch is clearly out of reach. Lignite fuel is produced at very low cost on-site. All
the dynamics we see in marginal costs for electricity production from lignite are due
to varying CO2 prices. Hard coal on the other hand is imported at world market
prices. Freight costs and emission costs apply on top. While lignite is slightly more
emission intensive than hard coal, higher CO2 prices still drive marginal costs for
both technologies. The relative difference in emission intensity is not as large as it
is between hard coal and gas. Thus, the leverage for CO2 prices is much smaller
when comparing hard coal with lignite. For a fuel switch to occur, one would need to
see drastically dropping prices for hard coal and/or drastically increasing prices for
emission allowances to compensate for the fuel price advantage that lignite currently
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enjoys. Both does not seem likely yet. Let us consider what the implications would
be if any other fuels switched order:
Let us first consider the case of a fuel switch between lignite and cheaper technologies.
Possible candidates are wind, solar, biomass, hydro, and nuclear. The marginal costs
of renewables can reasonably be considered to be zero. While this is not entirely
true for biomass, biomass capacities in Germany are remunerated through a specific
feed-in tariff, which puts them for the merit-order into the same category as wind or
solar. As lignite has evidently non-zero marginal costs, a fuel switch of lignite and
one of the renewable technology appears to be out of reach.
Nuclear, in contrast, has positive but small and rather stable fuel costs. A switch
with lignite appears to be unlikely. But even if such a switch occurred, what would
be the consequence? Consider the Figures 5 and 6 depicting the range of costs
between lignite and hard coal: In case some cheaper technology took the position of
lignite, this new fuel would become the new closest competitor. Thus, the cost range
in which lignite can be considered to be marginal would shrink.
Consider now the case of a fuel switch at the other end of the merit-order, e.g. between
hard coal and natural gas. Such a change of relative position is not impossible and
has been witnessed in several markets before (e.g. in the USA in conjunction with
decreasing natural gas prices). Again, in Figures 5 and 6, if we had a fuel switch
at the upper end, there would be a new closest competitor upwards, e.g. natural
gas instead of hard coal, and the relevant cost range would become smaller. Thus,
considering fuel switching would drive our results even further down, pointing to less
importance of lignite as a price setting technology.
In summary, the possibility of a fuel switch would rather decrease the likelihood of
lignite being marginal. As we solely considered hard coal as a closest competitor
here, we are rather over-estimating the relevance of lignite as a marginal technology,
which could also explain our larger findings here compared to the quantity based
approach.
5.3.3 Robustness check: peak and off peak prices
The analysis of costs and prices has yet focused on daily average prices. This
allows overcoming the implausible assumption that lignite plants can adjust quickly
to hourly changes in the markets. In contrast, by bidding for complete days, the
marginal cost of lignite plants might have an important effect on the equilibrium price
for electricity. These daily averages obviously wash down price variation, e.g. between
night and day hours. One might thus wonder if evaluating complete days could mask
the marginality of lignite plants specifically during the off-peak hours. Therefore,
we split our hourly prices into blocks between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., capturing prices
during the day and between 8 p.m. and 8 a.m. for the night. For not splitting two
consecutive nights in half, we have shifted the last four hours of each day to the
next day. Thus, we calculate an average price per night, capturing 12 consecutive
hours. Doing so, and comparing the corresponding prices with our marginal cost
range gives us 87 day-time averages as well as 130 nights where prices are in that
range. In total, this amounts to 14.8 percent of all days or nights.
As an extreme case, one could assume lignite plants to be completely flexible and to
adjust production to every price change in the day-ahead-market. Disaggregating
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our measure down to the hourly level, we observe that 2574 out of 17544 hours in
our sample (14.7 percent) fulfil this criterion.
Note, however, that for this to be appropriate, we would need to assume that lignite
plants are capable of ramping up and down sufficiently quickly to adjust to shorter
price changes on a 12 hour or even the hourly level. Thus, again, these numbers are
likely to exaggerate the relevance of lignite plants as price-setting technologies.
6 Conclusion and policy implications
We have presented two different approaches to evaluate the relevance of specific power
production technologies to be price setting. One approach solely focuses on quantity
data and takes a merit order of technologies as given. Comparing the derived residual
demand with available capacity provides an indicator for the technology in question
to be price-setting. Neither price nor cost data is needed. The other approach is
independent of any quantity data by simply calculating minimal marginal costs for
competing technologies. Comparing the range between those costs with realised
wholesale electricity prices provides an alternative measure for the price-setting
generation technology. Both approaches are computationally simple and lightweight
and use data which is usually available for most power markets. Moreover, the
approaches are based on a number of assumptions that are frequently made in the
study of power markets. But as both approaches vary in the assumptions they require
and in the data they use, comparing the obtained indicators from either approach
can be informative.
We apply both approaches to assess to which extent lignite power plants are price-
setting in the Austrian-German power market. The main contribution of this
application is to show that a range of differently obtained numbers all provide the
same message: Lignite is not price setting most of the times. Thereby, the two
approaches complement each other as they differ by their advantages and underlying
assumptions. For example, a major advantage of the cost-based approach is the
capability to accommodate short-run inflexibilities in electricity generation by using
daily average prices. Thus, there are days for which lignite is determined to be
marginal based on the price-cost comparison. But, based on the residual load
approach, one might find that the individual hours of these days do not indicate
that lignite plants are marginal because they are either inframarginal or out of the
market in the majority of hours when assuming that all plant flexibly adjust their
production. This example illustrates that both approaches are complementary and
their joint application offers additional insights. By applying both approaches, we
can assess the sensitivity of results that originate from the different assumptions and
investigate the importance of these assumptions in the particular setting.
In different cases, the assumptions of one or the other approach may be more or less
plausible. For example, the cost based approach might be prefered if prices and costs
are transparent and inflexibilities are considered to be important (as for hard coal or
in our example of lignite power in the German-Austrian market). On the contrary,
when we want to assess the marginality of more flexible technologies, such as gas
or hydro power, the residual load based approach may be preferable. Overall, we
recommend to apply both approaches to investigate whether qualitatively similar
conclusions can be drawn. If this is not the case, one might give more weight to one
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or the other approach based on data quality and the characteristics of the system.
For our case of lignite power in the German-Austrian market, overall results from
both approaches are comparable. For example, the frequency of hours for which
lignite is marginal in the residual load approach is around six times higher on days
where lignite is marginal based on the cost based approach compared to days where
this criterion is not fulfilled.
Our analyses suggest that lignite plants are price setting for more than 3 to 7 percent,
but evidently less than 15 percent of all observed periods in our sample, spanning
from 29 July 2015 to 28 July 2017. This result contrasts with the average contribution
of lignite power in the German-Austrian bidding zone in which lignite plants had
an average share of 39 percent in fossil fuel power production over the years 2005
to 2015. Evidently, the share in production and the relevance as a price setting
technology of lignite clearly diverge. While this insight might be trivial for experts, it
is of a certain relevance for policies that are implemented in a couple of EU member
states. The European commission allows to compensate electricity intensive sectors
for incurred indirect CO2 costs that are passed-on by power producers through the
electricity price. A key ingredient for the calculation of the compensation payments
are emission intensities of power production defined by the European Commission
that are based on the average contribution of specific fuels to the mix of fossil fuel
fired power production. Here, lignite is the most emission intensive technology but
is found to be inframarginal for most of the time.
Consequently, our analysis illustrates the potential fallacies that occur if policies
ignore the relevance of marginality in power generation. In the example of the EU
compensation scheme for indirect CO2 costs, our results suggest that the weight
of lignite in the specified regional emission factor is likely too high. A possible
alternative approach would be to ban lignite completely from the calculation of
the average emission intensity. In this case, the calculated emission factor in the
period from 2005 to 2015 would drop from around 0.733 to around 0.608 ton CO2
per MWh, representing a decrease of about 17 percent. Since the emission factor
enters the formula for the compensation payments in a multiplicative way, reducing
the emission factor by 17 percent leads to lower compensation payments by the same
order.
Doing so, however, would assume that lignite is not marginal in any hours (like it
is currently assumed for nuclear or renewable capacities as well). A more accurate
approach would capture lignite’s and the other fuels’ relevance as price-setting
technologies. Focusing only on lignite, our analysis suggests that just 3 to less then
15 percent of the emissions and electricity generated by lignite power plants should
enter the calculation of the emission factor. Assuming that the other fossil fuels’
emission intensities still enter according to their average contribution would then
yield an emission factor of about 0.622 or 0.668 ton CO2 per MWh, respectively.
Note, however, that not only the proportion of natural gas and hard coal being
marginal might differ as well from their average share in total production, but also
that we have found emission free technologies, such as nuclear or renewable power to
be price-setting during several hours of our sample period.
To translate these factors into monetary terms, consider the total compensation
payments in Germany in 2017 of about 202 million Euros (UBA 2019). Since
compensation payments scale linearly with the emission factor, reducing the emission
factor by about 15 (with 3 percent lignite being marginal) and 9 percent (with 15
20
percent lignite marginal) lowers total compensation payments to about 172 and 184
million Euros, respectively. While the absolute reductions of about 18 to 30 million
Euros in 2017 may seem not substantial, those compensation payments reflect rather
low EU ETS prices at that time with compensation in 2017 being based on a price
of 5.40 Euro per ton of CO2. Using the current prices of around 25 Euros per ton
CO2, total compensation payments would increase to around 935 million Euros, with
potential reductions to about 794 and 853 million Euros, respectively, through the
adjustment of lignite in the emission factor. Ultimately, a comprehensive analysis on
appropriate emission factors and targeted compensation level would have to study
the extent of marginality for all different technologies and their emission intensities.
However, such an analysis is out of the scope of this paper.
We propose the two approaches in this paper with the intention to provide a useful
tool for policy analysis beyond the specific example addressed here. This relates in
particular to the evaluation of energy policy impacts that work through electricity
prices, which is a common issue in many economic impact evaluations national and
international energy policies. Evidence on price-setting technologies in electricity
generation is much needed for other technologies, countries and time periods, which
is again, unfortunately out of the scope of this paper.
When applying our approaches to other generation technologies and / or other
geographic areas, focussing on a single country / price-zone within the increasingly
connected European electricity market may become an issue. For example, Blume-
Werry et al. (2018) found that the price-setting (marginal) plant in a country does
not have to be located within the same country. While this issue is potentially less
important in our analysis given the amount of relatively low cost generation available
in Germany (compared to neighbouring countries) and the inclusion of imports and
exports of electricity, it may be an important shortcoming of this approach applied
to a small market setting.4
Another avenue for application of the proposed methods would be a rule based
and dynamic adjustment of energy policy parameters. Our study suggests that
alternative procedures for the parametrisation of compensation policies are available
and that these approaches can be implemented in a transparent and computationally
non-demanding manner. Based on a predefined set of assumptions and data sources,
our approaches could be used for a dynamic updating of compensation levels as the
crucial policy parameters, depending on power prices and their constituents.
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